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THE MANY FACES OF SEXUAL CONSENT
WILLiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.*
Pat Califia's short story, "Jessie,"' commences with the wind-
mg down of a womyn's beer dance. The narrator, Liz, lover of
"butch-looking women," passes up several opportunities to go
home with available one-mght standing arounds. She has eyes
only for the lean, leathered, electric Jessie, the bass guitarist for
the band called "The Bitch."3
Jessie emerges from her dressing room. She claims Liz by
threading her white silk scarf through a ring in Liz's nondetach-
able throat collar. During the drive to Jessie's apartment, Liz
recounts her initiation, years earlier, into lesbian bondage and
discipline (B&D). They arrive at Jessie's apartment in a deserted
warehouse district. "I felt a twinge of alarm," Liz narrates. "I
hardly knew her. Anything could happen."5
At the apartment, Jessie slaps Liz hard enough to redden her
face, caresses her back and thighs, binds her hands together,
and forces Liz's mouth onto her geitals. "I am going to possess
you utterly, for my own pleasure, make you completely and
totally mine. Are you willing?" asks Jessie. "I've never wanted
anything more,"' is the response.
Jessie binds Liz to her poster bed and tortures her with hot
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is a revised
version of the Cutler Lecture delivered on February 28, 1995 at Marshall-Wythe
School of Law at the College of William and Mary. I appreciate the stimulating
questions posed after the Lecture, and especially the lead-off questions by Dean
Thomas Krattenmaker.
1. PAT CALIFIA, Jessie, in MACHO SLUTS: EROTIC FICTION 28 (1988).
2. Id. at 29.
3. Id. at 31.
4. Id. at 48.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 50.
7. Id.
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wax. "'Oh! No, no, no!"' cries the narrator. "The first rain of fire
fell upon my skin. I struggled and cried for mercy. 'I can't stand
this,' I wept." Liz begs Jessie to beat her, and the scene ends
when Liz passes out in ecstasy.
The story of Jessie and Liz challenges our thinking about a
concept as mystical as it is critical to the regulation of sexuality:
consent. Legal as well as popular discourse about sexual inter-
course focuses on whether both parties have consented, provid-
ing vivid evidence of Sir Henry Maine's assertion that modern
law is a movement from status to contract, from a medieval,
collectivist understanding of human relations to a liberal, indi-
vidual rights one. Is "Jessie" the triumph of Maine's assertion,
or is it the neo-Victorians' counterexample? When is consent the
appropriate criterion for evaluating or regulating sexual interac-
tion? What constitutes meaningful consent?
Returning from time to time to the Califia short story, this
Article explores the role of sexual consent in American law. I
first examine the many faces law finds for consent or its oppo-
site; these many faces reveal the impossibility of divorcing con-
sent from context and social policy. For this reason, the very
meaning of consent has changed markedly in the last generation
in response to women's increased power. My thesis is that the
law of consent ought to and probably will change in other ways
now that gay power joins and sometimes stands in opposition to
women's power. "Jessie" illustrates one cutting edge-sado-
masochism (S&M)-that serrates traditional liberalism, modern
feminism, and gaylaw.
I. LIBERALISM CANNOT EASILY ACCOUNT FOR THE MANY FACES
OF SEXUAL CONSENT
Most of the citizens of Virginia presume, with liberal theory,
that human beings are autonomous decisionmakers. Each indi-
vidual seeks to satisfy her or his preferences, and liberal theory
gives the individual wide berth to make this search. The main
limitation liberal theory would place on sexual intercourse is
5. Id. at 57.
9. Id.
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that it be "consensual." Because sex is usually a joint enterprise,
the parties ought to be able to engage in it if they both agree to
it. Party One says "yes," and Party Two says "yes": legal inter-
course. Party One says "no" or Party Two says "no": illegal inter-
course. What if, as in the Califia short story, Party Two says
both "yes" and "no"? This raises a puzzle that can be generalized
immediately.
Whether sexual intercourse is legal in the state of Virginia"°
depends surprisingly little on whether the parties both say "yes."
It depends more critically on other considerations, especially the
identities of the parties, their relationship, and precisely what
form their intercourse takes. Note, for example, the following
circumstances in which consent is either negated or rendered
irrelevant under Virginia law.
1. Consent Negated Only by Serious Physical Injury (Marital
Rape). Vaginal sex between cohabiting husband and wife is
presumed conclusively to be consensual in Virginia, so long as
there is no "serious physical injury."'l If Liz and Jess(i)e were
cohabiting wife and husband, the bondage and discipline de-
scribed would probably be immune from state regulation, even if
Liz's protests constituted a withdrawal of her consent to sexual
intercourse.
2. Consent Negated by Physical Coercion (Rape). Sex between
two unmarried adults, or a husband and wife who are not living
together, is not consensual if it occurs over one party's objec-
tions, or if one party is coerced into sex by "force, threat or in-
timidation."2 Economic threats (e.g., "I'll withhold money I owe
you if you don't have sex with me") are not considered coercion
in this context. 3 Whether Jessie raped Liz in the short story is
10. I shall use Virginia law in this Article, but most of the points I make can be
made for other states as well.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1995); cf. Weishaupt v. Common-
wealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984) (holding that spouse can revoke "implied
consent" to sex by leaving husband and creating a de facto end to marriage). Be-
tween 1986 and 1994, Virginia law required spouses to report rapes within ten days
of their occurrence. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B) (Michie 1988). For a discussion of
the marital rape allowance in other states, see Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in
New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261 (1993).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i) (Michie Supp. 1995); see Bailey v. Common-
wealth, 82 Va. 107 (1886).
13. The Model Penal Code has a crime of "gross sexual imposition," a third-degree
19951 49
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ambiguous. One might argue that although sex was forced upon
Liz over her verbal objections, Liz had earlier "consented" to this
sort of sexual relationship.
3. Consent Negated by Economic Inducement (Workplace Ha-
rassment, Prostitution). Sex between an employer and employee
is not consensual if it occurs over the employee's objections, or if
the employee is coerced into sex by physical force or threats of
force or is induced into sex by economic threats or promises. 4
Economic inducement renders the interaction illegal if one party
makes her or his living by trading sex for money. 5 If either
Jessie or Liz were a prostitute, their sex for pay would thus be
illegal.
4. Consent Irrelevant Because of the Form of the Activity (Sod-
omy, S&M). Sex between two parties is illegal if it involves sod-
omy (oral, anal, and oral-anal sex) 6 or if it involves physical
harm resulting from sadomasochistic role playing, 7 even if
both parties have said "yes." The easiest-to-spot illegality in
"Jessie" is the couple's commission of sodomy.'"
felony, which is based upon nonphysical coercion. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)
(1980). The commentary indicates that economic coercion would trigger this liability,
id. § 213.1(2)(a) commentary at 312 (1980), but in the dozen or so states having a
provision such as this one, see, e.g., NJ). CENT. CODE § 12.1-20.03 (1993) (gross
sexual imposition); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (Baldwin 1995) (gross sexual
imposition), I have not seen a reported case invoking such a theory.
14. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) considers this sexual
harassment that violates Title VII and explicitly warns that a woman's agreement to
economically induced sex excuses the violation. Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1994).
In 1978, legislation was introduced in Virginia that would have imposed crimi-
nal liability in cases in which the defendant abused his "position of authority" to
obtain sex from someone subordinate to him, including "occupation[al]" relationships.
See S.B. 291, 1978 Sess. (1978), discussed in ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND
THE LAW 111 & n.70 (1984).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346 (Michie Supp. 1995). Every state but Nevada
criminalizes prostitution. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 794 (1988).
16. Virginia quaintly calls this "crimes against nature," or "carnal knowledge," VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (Michie Supp. 1995), but has a separate crime that it calls
"forcible sodomy," id. § 18.2-67.1.
17. Virginia law is not completely clear on this point, but this interpretation is
suggested by Martin v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 43 (Va. 1946). In a leading S&M
case, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted and followed Martin. State v. Collier, 372
N.W.2d 303, 306 (Iowa 1985).
18. Virginia law considers it marital sexual assault if the husband forces sodomy
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5. Consent Irrelevant Because of the Relationship of the Par-
ticipants (Adultery, Fornication, Incest). Sex between two parties
is not legally permissible if they are not married to one anoth-
er,19 or if they are related to one another." "Jessie" provides
another easy-to-spot illegality: as unmarried sex partners, Liz
and Jessie have committed the crime of fornication.
6. Consent Negated by the Identity of One of the Participants
(Pedophilia, Bestiality, Mental Disability). Sex between two
parties is not consensual if one of the parties is under the age of
fifteen,2' is an animal,' or was led into intercourse by reason
of her mental or physical disability." The legal incapacity of
one of the parties to agree to the intercourse negates consent. In
"Jessie," the question arises whether Liz's masochism is a men-
tal disability targeted by Virginia's rape law.
This legal array poses intractable difficulties for liberal theory
of sexuality. For example, sex is often illegal when both parties
say "yes." Indeed, most of the above categories are ones in which
formal acquiescence does not rescue the legality of the inter-
course: prostitution, sodomy, sadomasochism, pedophilia, bestial-
ity, sex with the mentally disabled, fornication, adultery, and
incest. Conversely, intercourse between cohabiting spouses is
legal, even when one partner says "no," as long as there is no
serious physical injury. Likewise, it may also be legal in Virginia
for a man to rape a woman if she says "no" after penetration.24
or genital penetration by an inanimate object upon his wife against her will, but
only if the couple is separated, or the abusive spouse causes serious physical injury.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2(B) (Michie Supp. 1995). Even if Liz and Jess(i)e were a mar-
ried husband and wife, forcible sodomy could thus pierce the marital rape allowance.
19. If the two people are simply unmarried, the act is criminal "fornication," id. §
18.2-344 (Michie 1988), and if one or both are married to other people, it is "adul-
tery," id. § 18.2-365.
20. Sex between related persons is the crime of "incest." Id. § 18.2-366 (Michie
Supp. 1995).
21. To have sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 13 is statutory rape,
id. § 18.2-61(A)(iii), and for an adult to have sex with a child between the ages of
13 and 15 is a Class Four felony, id. § 18.2-63. The act is a lesser offense if the
defendant is also a minor. Id.
22. This acts falls under "crimes against nature." Id. § 18.2-361(A).
23. If sexual intercourse is accomplished "through the use of the complaining
witness's mental incapacity or physical helplessness," it is rape. Id. § 18.2-61(A)(ii).
24. Perversely, the law in Maryland (and probably also the law in Virginia, al-
though no case law is on point) is that a woman who says "no" has nonetheless
1995]
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A more complex liberal perspective renders the categorical
scheme more coherent, however. Consent might still be the orga-
nizing principle if understood in a more complicated way.
1. Capacity. Liberal theory denies the existence of consent if
one of the parties has insufficient "capacity" to make autono-
mous decisions. The concept of insufficient capacity helps ex-
plain the law's rigidity in category six, in which the incapacity of
a participant negates consent. This argument does not apply to
the other categories, and may be a fuzzy justification even for
category six. Should mental disability establish a presumption of
rape? Given the wide range of mental disabilities, a liberal may
find it hard to accept this proposition across the board. The
proposition is easier for a liberal to accept in regard to children
under age fifteen, but national surveys suggest that a large por-
tion of children who are fourteen or fifteen have engaged in sexu-
al intercourse. Do these adolescents not have the decisionmaking
"capacity" to make decisions about sexual behavior?
2. The Public-Private Distinction. Categories one and three
may be explained through liberalism's famed "public-private"
distinction: the state should be most reluctant to interfere in
zones of privacy (like marriage, category one) and most willing
to interfere in zones of public intercourse (like the workplace,
category three). This argument does nothing to justify the regu-
lation of Liz and Jessie---categories four, five, and six-which
usually regulates sex that occurs in contexts just as "private" as
the marital bed. Such a distinction also seems like a particularly
illiberal way to distinguish categories one and two: why should
the victim of marital rape receive so much less protection than
the victim of date rape? The liberal also has some trouble distin-
guishing date rape (category two) from prostitution (category
three) because both involve action in the sexual "marketplace,"
and little reason exists, from a liberal point of view, to regulate
prostitution so differently.'
"consented" to the rape if she says "no" after penetration has occurred. Battle v.
State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Md. 1980).
25. The john's spending $300 to purchase the prostitute's intercourse directly is
per se illegal, but the rich date's spending the same $300 to purchase the poorer
date's intercourse indirectly is illegal only if accompanied by physical threats. A
more striking difference, of course, is that in the former situation the law tends to
[Vol. 37:47
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3. The Law Changes Slowly. Liberal consent-based regimes of
legal regulation do not spring full-grown from the brow of Zeus.
They accrete over time, gradually displacing traditional status-
based regimes. Categories two and three represent the core
liberal regime, and categories one, four, five, and six are atavis-
tic holdovers from the olden days. Like the human appendix,
these holdovers might be harmless incoherences. This argument
admits that we do not enjoy a liberal regime for regulating sexu-
ality, and that the regime we do have reflects a mixture of con-
sent-based and status-based rules. The ubiquitous language of
consent is just a rhetorical device for discussing the issue, but a
device masking the more complex reality.
The contention that the language of consent is a mere rhetori-
cal device has both descriptive and normative bite. The exemp-
tion of marital rape from the law's concern (category one) has
been under fire in recent years, and it is not clear how vigilantly
the criminal justice system enforces the prohibitions in catego-
ries four (sodomy) and five (fornication, adultery) today." Re-
cent legislative attention, however, has relaxed only slightly the
marital rape exemption and has left the sodomy prohibition
entirely in place. Liz and Jessie could therefore be prosecuted for
their actions. The prohibitions in category six are also as robust
as ever. Furthermore, even when not enforced by a criminal
arrest, these prohibitions continue to have legal consequences.
For instance, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the
fornication prohibition bars a partner infected with herpes sim-
plex from suing her unmarried lover.27
II. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL CONSENT
The obvious implication of the foregoing analysis is that
American law regulating sexuality is concerned with status as
go after the induced person (the prostitute) and not the inducer (the john), while in
the latter situation the law goes after the inducer (the person who rapes) and not
the induced person (the rape victim).
26. See Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1206 (4th Cir. 1986) (explaining that virtu-
ally no possibility exists that heterosexual consenting adults would be prosecuted for
fornication).
27. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S,.2d 721 (Va. 1990).
1995]
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well as with consent, even if it views the latter as dominant or
ascendant. The less obvious implication is the connection be-
tween consent and status. Ultimately, both must be seen as
legal constructions reflecting larger dynamics of ideology and
power. The lesson of this analysis is that liberalism itself fails to
explain the operation of consent in an apparently liberal society.
The limits of consent as an organizing principle reflect the limits
of liberalism itself.
A. Consent as Contextual and Status-Based
A asks B to have intercourse, and B declines. The next day, A
offers B a diamond ring if B will have intercourse with A, and B
accepts the ring and has sex with A. This scenario may sound
like the quintessential, and therefore legal, consensual sex, but
my analysis suggests that the issue of consent, and of legality, is
not clear until I provide further information about the context of
this exchange:
a The intercourse between A and B is consensual and legal if A
and B are dating or are married (categories one and two). In-
deed, this example is the classic scenario by which the couple
segues from dating to marriage.
* The intercourse between A and B is legally problematic if A is
B's employer and is criminally illegal if B earns a living by trad-
ing sex for valuables (both category three). In the first variation,
A, as B's employer, might be sued for sexual harassment. In the
second, B might be arrested for prostitution.
* The intercourse between A and B is criminally illegal if A and
B engage in sodomy or harmful sadomasochism (category four)
or if A is married to C (category five). The intercourse is a major
crime if B is related to A (category five) or is a child or mentally
disabled (category six).
If the point were not clear before, this exercise reveals that
consent is inherently contextual: the same conduct in one cir-
cumstance will be legal, while in a slightly different context it
will be criminal. Consent is not a simple volitional category, as
[Vol. 37:47
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it is typically treated. Instead, the issue of legal consent is in-
herently concerned with legal status and social policy.
The foregoing example reveals the intimate connection be-
tween consent and status. The same actions by A and B will
have strikingly different legal meanings depending upon B's
status as a spouse, or as an employee or sex worker, or as a
sodomite, relative, child, or mentally disabled person. What is
recognized as a valid choice cannot, even in a liberal society, be
separated from the status of the chooser(s) and the chosen. The
connection between choice and status is not an historical acci-
dent, the chance perpetuation of status categories in the modern
regulatory categories of consent. Instead, status and consent are
both conceptions serving a larger cultural script.
A further variation suggests how this cultural script is socially
regulatory. A asks B to have sexual intercourse, and B says
"yes." This scenario would appear to be consensual, unless the
intercourse falls under categories four, five, or six. Even if, how-
ever, A and B are complete strangers, with no status relation-
ship, the "yes" might not mean "yes" and might be treated as a
legal "no." For example, if A has a knife to B's throat and that
knife is an inducement to B's agreeing to have sex, the law will
regard the interaction as a rape, notwithstanding the verbalized
"yes" (category two). Nevertheless, the knife to the throat will
probably not be considered a rape if the threat is part of Liz and
Jessie's S&M game, as long as the parties have consented to the
interaction. An assault or sodomy prosecution (category four)
may follow, but even then a rape prosecution would be unlikely.
These variations reveal the openly regulatory nature of the legal
construction of consent. Consider next the regulatory regime
instantiated by the many faces of sexual consent.
B. Consent as a Construction of Procreative Marriage
Once the law of consent is understood as a regulatory regime,
it becomes more coherent. The key regulatory policy is procre-
ative companionate marriage, an institution that became en-
trenched in Western culture during the late Roman Empire and
the early Middle Ages.' Under this ideology, an important role
28. The ideology surrounding companionate marriage is developed in PETER
1995]
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of the state is to protect the "sanctity" of marriage by refusing to
regulate procreative sex within the union (the exemption for
marital rape, category one) and by policing sex outside of mar-
riage (namely, fornication and adultery, category five). Sexual
activities not contributing to the procreative project (sodomy,
category four, and bestiality, category six) are also disapproved.
For reasons of eugenics and the sanctity of the family unit, mar-
riage is not available to closely related people (category five) or
to children and the mentally disabled (category six).
Once procreative marriage is seen as the organizing principle,
Virginia's law of sexual consent is more explicable. Indeed, the
thesis that procreative marriage is the common strand in sexual
consent laws is supported strikingly by the most bizarre of
Virginia's sexual consent rules. In Virginia, a child fourteen
years or older can "retroactively" consent to sex with an adult if
the adult later marries -the child.29 That is, marriage by the
adult and the child is not only legally sanctioned pedophilia
(otherwise quite illegal), but also retroactively absolves the adult
from his prior crime of statutory rape.
Notwithstanding social changes that have diminished the
inviolability and social significance of marriage, that institution
remains critically important to the law of sexual consent. In
turn, the law of sexual consent testifies to the robustness of
marriage as an American institution. Marriage remains a legally
protected terrain insulated from state interference and regulated
to allow only certain couples to enter into it.
This proposition is both supported by and helps explain the
Supreme Court's right to privacy cases and the robustness of
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.3 ° Writing
in 1961, Justice Harlan maintained that the state could not
regulate contraception and other "intimate details of the marital
BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN EARLY
CHRISTIANITY (1988); 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert
Hurley trans., 1986).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-66 (Michie Supp. 1995).
30. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For the story of this dissent
and its subsequent influence, see DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 131-95, 597 (1994).
[Vol. 37:47
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relation,"3' thereby anticipating the Court's decision four years
later in Griswold v. Connecticut.32 He excepted from constitu-
tional protection "[a]dultery, homosexuality and the like."33
This exception directly anticipated the Court's decision twenty-
five years later in Bowers v. Hardwick34 and provides an expla-
nation for why fornication, adultery, and incest laws have not
received serious constitutional challenges under Griswold. Al-
though not anticipating the Court's application of the privacy
right to protect a woman's right to an abortion, Justice Harlan's
opinion formed the explicit intellectual foundation for the
Court's reaffirmation of a diluted right to abortion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.3"
The constitutional right to privacy cases stand for the proposi-
tion that the state presumptively cannot regulate what goes on
inside the marital bedroom. These cases find a parallel in the
law's allowance for marital rape in circumstances not allowed in
dating or employment. The constitutional cases allow the state
to criminalize sodomy, a form of sex not traditionally linked to
marriage because it is not useful for procreation. These cases
also allow the state to perpetuate traditional barriers to mar-
riage: when a party is underage, closely related to the other
party, or mentally disabled. Those barriers to marriage are mir-
rored in the law of sexual consent. My case of Liz and Jessie
falls outside the adamantine protections of the right to privacy:
the state is free to terrorize them because what they do is not
procreative, and as a same-sex couple, they are not even poten-
tially married.
C. Consent as a Construction of Social Power
If the law of sexual consent is a policy- rather than logic-based
construction, then one must ask what has informed or motivated
31. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The majority opinion in Griswold expressly relied on
Justice Harlan's Poe dissent. Id. at 484. The Court later extended the privacy right
to unmarried couples. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
33. Poe, 367 U.S. at 553, quoted in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
34. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J.).
19951
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that construction. The starting point for such an inquiry is obvi-
ous. Modern American law generally has been constructed by
striving middle-aged men, and the law of sexual consent has
been no different. Therefore, one should expect that the law of
sexual consent would reflect a partial, and not universal, point
of view. The most striking thing about the Griswold line of cas-
es, as well as the law of sexual consent, is that it reflects a vi-
sion of marriage that embodies an ideology of traditional mascu-
linity that views man as hunter and woman as helper and
breeder. Marriage can be the refuge of the rapist, and the imag-
es that are most threatening to middle-class heterosexual
males-the sodomite, the child molester, the homewrecker-are
placed cleanly beyond the realm of sexual consent. The law of
sexual consent is primarily a law responsive to Victorian male
fantasies.
Primarily, but no longer entirely. The last generation has
witnessed a significant change in social power relations as a
result of the women's rights movement. Although women have
not achieved anything like equal economic, social, or political
rights, they have made collective and individual progress and
are now a legal force to be reckoned with. If the law is a social
construction, one would expect the women's power movement to
affect and move law in ways that reflect the desires and prefer-
ences of the newly empowered group. Indeed, Roe v. Wade36
and Casey37-the Court's only robust expansion of the right to
privacy beyond the Harlan position' -- are scarcely conceivable
absent a potent women's movement.
The law of sexual consent has changed in at least three im-
portant ways in response to women's voices during the last half
generation. First, states have either abolished the common law's
complete exemption of marital rape or have replaced the exemp-
tion with a more narrowly formulated marital rape allowance
(category one). Those allowances, in turn, are under constant
pressure and will likely be narrowed or eliminated in most
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. 112 S. Ct. 2791.
38. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), expanded Griswold to allow un-
married couples access to contraceptives and therefore goes beyond the Harlan posi-
tion, but Eisenstadt has not generated a vigorous line of Supreme Court follow-ups.
[Vol. 37:47
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states over time.39 Second, the law of rape (category two) has
been liberalized greatly in Virginia and every other state. This
liberalization has resulted in'an expansion of the list of in-
ducements that constitute rape and an easing of proof at trial.
This process of liberalization can also be expected to continue.4"
Third, federal prohibitions against sexual harassment on the job
(category three) have developed, virtually from scratch, in the
last fifteen years.4' These prohibitions reflect the polity's real-
ization that women are in the workplace for good and that old-
fashioned workplace norms must adjust to this reality.
Considering the potentially revolutionary implications of
women's power, the above is a modest list. Even the "reformed"
areas contain glaring loopholes in the protection of women's
interests. The modesty of the list reflects the fact that the
women's power movement has mounted no unified challenge to
the primacy of marriage as the basis for the regulation of sexual
consent and has had little effect on the rules in categories four,
five, and six, the categories that most affect women like those
about whom Pat Califia writes. Feminist theory has addressed
these issues, criticizing the institution of marriage, the selective
enforcement of prostitution laws, and the taboo against sodomy,
to take the main examples. Feminist theoreticians, however, are
themselves divided on the first two issues, and middle-class
women, as a group, have shown insufficiently sustained interest
in any of these issues to move the law very much. Hence, they
remain firmly entrenched in a regulatory regime grounded in
traditional status classifications.
39. On the marital rape allowance, see DIANA Eli. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE
(1982); Robin West, Equality Theory, Mdrital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990); Anne C. Dailey, Note, To Have and
To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1255 (1986); Sitton, supra note 11.
40. On recent reforms and their inadequacy from a feminist perspective, see SU-
SAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 80-91 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172-83 (1989).
41. The law was all but created by CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HA-
RASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979), which was considered unthinkably radical in
1979 and is today considered conventional wisdom.
42. See supra notes 39-40 for a catalog of sources discussing both the marital rape
allowance and the practical, as well as theoretical, deficiencies in rape law.
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This inertia has been rattled by a further social develop-
ment-gay power. Just as women asserted their rights and their
political power in the 1960s and early 1970s, so gay peo-
ple-lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgendered people-have
spoken out in the 1980s and early 1990s. Bisexual, lesbian, and
gay male thinkers have joined feminist thinkers in questioning
the traditional regulatory assumptions of the laws of marriage
and sexual consent. More importantly, gay experiences are in
the process of diversifying our understanding of sexuality itself.
Building upon feminist understandings, gaylaw suggests a
reconception of the law of sexual consent.
III. SEXUAL CONSENT FROM A GAY PERSPECTIVE
Although building upon feminist theory, gay theory flows from
gay experience. That experience is now characteristic of a signif-
icant segment of American-and Virginian-society, straight and
undecided, as well as gay. The gay experience fights against the
current status-based law more deeply than women's collective
experience has done thus far. On the whole, the gay experience
offers American law the opportunity to work toward a more
unified approach to issues of sexual consent, but an approach
that is also more tolerant of sexual diversity.
A. How the Gay Experience Is Different
No stereotypical "gay lifestyle" exists, but the gay experience
has been systematically different from the straight experience in
late-twentieth-century America. The main difference is that for
gay people, sexual intimacy is disconnected from procreation.
Lesbians and gay men have children and raise families, and
bisexuals often have children with primary sexual partners. On
the whole, however, gay people's children come through prior
relationships, artificial insemination, surrogacy, and adoption,
not as a consequence of their primary intimate relationships.
Many consequences flow from this fact. Having no relationship
to procreation, same-sex intimacy, such as that described in
"Jessie," is more insistently and openly connected to other val-
ues: self-expression, bonding with another person, and pleasure.
Without an anchor (even if only rhetorical) in procreation, same-
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sex intimacy is more openly committed to sexual diversity than
is different-sex intimacy.
A further difference is related to the coming-out process. In
our society, maturing adolescents are presumed, and strongly
hoped, to be developing heterosexuals. For the adolescent or
young adult who feels attraction to people of the same sex, the
maturing experience is doubly hard because the person must
deal not onlywith confusing feelings and society's anxiety about
sexuality, but also with society's, and especially parents', anxiety
about sexual deviation. The tension between one's secret orienta-
tion and society's expectations yields a continuum of responses,
from the "closet" to "coming out" as a gay person.
For an openly gay person, sexual orientation is more strongly
constitutive of identity-one's self-image as well as the way
other people see one-than it is for a straight person. By tying
sexual preferences firmly to personal identity, this phenomenon
has contributed to open explorations of sexual diversity. The
first-generation coming-out stories, by literary pioneers such as
Edmund White, are stories of homosexual deviation. In contrast,
the second-generation stories, by writers such as Paul Monette
and Pat Califia, often involve coming out'as a person with AIDS
or with HIV, or as a sadist or masochist. Most people with AIDS
and most sadists or masochists are heterosexual, but the ones
who are willing to talk about it tend to be homosexual.
A consequence of these two differences is that the lesbian, gay
male, and bisexual community is more relentlessly "liberal"
about sexuality than is the straight community, including most
straight women. As people who have been considered "sexual
outlaws" to some degree, we naturally have less commitment to
traditional status-based regulations and are more tolerant of
sexual diversity. As people who have gone through the difficult
coming-out process, we tend to be individualists rather than
traditionalists. Often repelled or shunned by our blood families,
we have formed "families of choice" that meet our emotional
needs. Sex contributes to our personal flourishing and our crav-
ing for interhuman connection.
A third difference, felt primarily and recently by the bisexual
and gay male community, is generated by the AIDS epidemic. If
gay sex sidesteps the creation of life, it now also waltzes in the
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shadow of death. The far-reaching consequences of AIDS are
still soaking into our culture. That Califia does not mention
AIDS in her short story is much more remarkable now than it
was in 1988 when the story was published, and Califia is now
best-known for her no-nonsense health and sex column in The
Advocate, a gay journal. Califia's column reflects the new values
that are being developed as the gay community responds to the
epidemic. Those values include insistence upon not only safer
sex, but also candid conversations about HIV status, a
nonjudgmental attitude that encourages disclosure of HIV status
and prior partners, and a responsibility toward one's partner,
especially if he is sick.
B. Implications of Gay Experience for Theories of Sexual
Consent
The gay experience combines a self-interested antitraditional-
ism with a libertarian respect for sexual diversity and an egali-
tarian insistence upon mutuality. Consider the ramifications gay
theory might have for the regulation of sexual consent. I shall
explore these ramifications explicitly in connection with feminist
theory, which has marked the conceptual frontiers of thinking
about sexual consent. On some issues, gaylaw will follow the
path marked by feminism. On other issues, they will tend to
diverge. On still other issues, gaylaw will take the lead.
Feminist theory rejects marriage as the organizing principle
for issues of sexual consent, on the ground that marriage has
been constructed as a patriarchal institution. Mutuality is of-
fered as a better organizing principle. Gaylaw will and ought to
follow feminism's lead. From our point of view, marriage is a
rotten organizing principle, first, because same-sex couples are
excluded from marriage.43 Even if gay marriage were recog-
43. The Virginia marriage statute explicitly prohibits same-sex marriages, VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1995), one of only about a half-dozen states that I
know have an explicit prohibition, see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-7-1-2 (Burns 1987);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4
(West Supp. 1995) (the 1989 Historical and Statutory Notes explain that "[niothing
in this act shall be construed so as to legitimize or validate a 'homosexual
marriage'"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-:2 (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01
(West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995).
[Vol. 37:47
HeinOnline  -- 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 62 1995-1996
SEXUAL CONSENT
nized, however, gaylaw would still follow feminist objections to
the centrality of marriage, to the extent that the institution car-
ries with it the assumption that sex is for procreation. Allied
with most feminist theorists," gaylaw presses for the repeal of
state sodomy and fornication laws.
More importantly, gaylaw ought to and will embrace the femi-
nist insistence that the lodestar precept be mutuality rather
than formality. 5 Thus, gaylaw is sympathetic to feminist criti-
cisms of rape law's willingness to tolerate episodes in which B
acquiesces in, but does not welcome, sex with A. Similarly,
gaylaw, as I see it, is hostile to laws allowing unwanted sex
within marriage (the marital rape allowance). Gaylaw suggests
new arenas for applying the feminist concept of mutuality. One
such arena brings gaylaw into direct conflict with a prominent
segment of feminism-S&M or B&D, the theme of "Jessie."
Feminists, including lesbian feminists, have criticized B&D as
embodying a male-oriented view of sex as domination, pain, and
conquest. 6 Many feminists who do not subscribe to Andrea
Dworkin's charge that all male-penetrative sex is rape are none-
theless sympathetic to the position that sex involving bondage
and torture is not truly consensual. Gay experience is, on the
whole, more sympathetic to B&D practices.47 To begin with,
many gays find that verbal and physical drama (including dom-
ination and bondage) is what makes sex "sexy," and many others
accept this as a preference others may legitimately feel. Femi-
nist objections to B&D per se are contradicted by the experience
some have with this array of sexual practices. Indeed, gay theorists
such as Gayle Rubin charge that Dworkin and other radical femi-
nists have an unhealthily narrow view of sexual expression."
44. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 284-87 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosex-
uality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 206-18; Beverly
Balos, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 317 (1991).
45. See Chamallas, supra note 15, at 814-43.
46. See, e.g., AGAINST SADOMASOCHISM: A RADICAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS (Robin R.
Linden et al. eds., 1982).
47. See CALIFIA, supra note 1; LEATHERFOLK: RADICAL SEX, PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND
PRACTICE (Mark Thompson ed., 1991) (especially the contributions by Guy Baldwin,
Pat Califia, Gayle Rubin, and Carol Truscott).
48. See Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER
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A recurring theme in the perhaps idealized B&D literature is
that giving one's body entirely over to the bonds and whips of
another person represents sex at its most deeply consensual
because the surrender of one's body to the control of another is
an act of extraordinary trust that requires an equally extraordi-
nary responsibility.49 The B&D literature suggests both proce-
dural and substantive methods by which to achieve the feminist
goal of mutual benefit from sex in a society of diverse sexual
preferences. Procedurally, a discussion of what is enjoyable and
what is unwelcome for each party is supposed to preface the
B&D encounter. The participants are expected to agree upon a
"safe word" that stops the action when it has gone too far for
either one. Substantively, the play of bondage and discipline is
supposed to be limited to the scene and not reflected in daily
life. Apologists for leathersex claim that their form of interaction
liberates its participants and, if anything, diffuses social aggres-
sion and violence.5 ° This claim has yet to be evaluated, but
gaylaw ought to be open to it.
On the other hand, the B&D decisions in the case law remind
us that trust is often abused and suggest that some B&D rela-
tionships, even if formally agreed to, have malignant long-term
effects on one or both partners. The few reported cases tend to
reject arguments of consent when the relationship has produced
serious physical injury and has taken on a dynamic similar to
that of sexual battering.5 A challenge for gaylaw is to develop
1, 28-30 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
49. See Carol Truscott, SIM: Some Questions and a Few Answers, in
LEATHERFOLK, supra note 47, at 15, 25.
50. See LEATHERFOLK, supra note 47.
51. See State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 304, 307-08 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (up-
holding assault conviction of male out-call model (prostitute) coordinator (pimp) who
tied up and beat female model); Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1053-
54, 1061 (Mass. 1980) (upholding assault conviction arising out of two-year S&M
relationship in which the victim claimed that he had not consented to the repeated
beatings); State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27, 28, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (up-
holding assault conviction of husband who beat his wife when she consumed alcohol,
notwithstanding her apparent consent). Some of the older cases appear to be wrong-
ly decided under the standard I am suggesting. See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 439, 446-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (upholding assault conviction of maker of
S&M fantasy films, notwithstanding apparent consent and lack of serious physical
injury).
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a better-articulated line between sadomasochistic fantasies and
simply sadistic battering, for same-sex battering is just as perva-
sive and just as destructive as different-sex battering.
An interesting, but not intractable, issue for gaylaw is sex
with people under the age of consent. The American gayocracy
(Robert Raben's term) has distanced itself from "man-boy love,"
even while American jurisdictions have progressively lowered
the age of consent. What has been missing in the American
hysteria about sex with children has been fact-based theorizing
about children's sexual development and the effects of sex with
older people on that development. On the one hand, substantial
evidence shows that adolescent "children" are, in fact, sexual
beings for whom experimentation is both natural and healthy.
The coming-out literature, the most popular form of gay autobi-
ography, is replete with examples of sexual experimentation by
adolescents under the age of fifteen,52 Virginia's age of con-
sent.53 The medical literature systematically supports this im-
pression and raises persistent doubts about American folk ef-
forts to repress adolescent sexuality; as adolescent suicide rates
attest, the repression may be a bigger problem than the possible
exploitation.
On the other hand, the gay experience suggests reasons to be
cautious. One of them is AIDS. The HIV virus has infected the
adolescent population through adolescent sex with older infected
people who take advantage of adolescent immaturity to induce
unsafe practices.54 Moreover, it may well be fair to do what Vir-
ginia has done, and to err on the side of caution in regulating
sex between adolescents and adults, while leaving sex among
adolescents essentially unregulated."
52. See, e.g., PAUL MONErE, BECOMING A MAN: HALF A LIFE STORY (1992);
FELICE PICANo, AMBIDEXTROUS: THE SECRET LIVES OF CHILDREN: A MEMOIR IN THE
FORM OF A NOVEL (1985); EDMUND WHITE, A BOY'S OWN STORY (1982).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Michie Supp. 1995).
54. See, e.g., MARY KITTREDGE, TEENS WITH AIDS SPEAK OUT 35-36 (1991); see
Karen Basen-Engquist & Guy S. Parcel, Attitudes, Norms, and Self-Efficacy: A Model
of Adolescents' IlV-Related Sexual Risk Behavior, 19 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 263 (1992).
55. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Michie Supp. 1995).
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C. Implications of Gay Experience for the Law of Sexual Consent
The regulatory regime envisioned by gaylaw would start with
the bedrock liberal precept that human decisionmakers ought to
be free to engage in the sexual activity of their mutual choice.
Gaylaw should urge rejection of traditionally status-based cate-
gories that render consent irrelevant. I would characterize
gaylaw's campaign for repeal or invalidation of sodomy laws in
the following manner. First, when both parties desire to commit
sodomy, they should have that choice. Conversely, sodomy forced
upon: one participant against her will should be illegal. What
most states call "forcible sodomy" should be treated the same as
forms of rape or sexual assault. Indeed, this treatment has been
the trend, even in states that retain general sodomy laws.56 A
substantially consent-based regime is one that respects the au-
tonomy of each participant and best fulfills the feminist goal of
mutuality, expanded by the gay experience of sexual diversity.
Liz and Jessie would be able to enjoy their unusual fantasies, as
would numerous other citizens of various sexual orientations.
A libertarian baseline is only the starting point, however.
Gaylaw should insist that "choice" be viewed realistically and
should explore the many ways in which sexual choice is or can
be "impaired." Choice can be impaired through (1) incapacity, (2)
undue pressure, or (3) fraud. The first category of impaired
choice reflects the current law of incapacity, and I would be
inclined to disturb little of it. Although I am open to medical and
psychiatric arguments about intergenerational sex, I am attract-
ed to Virginia's complex solution, criminalizing sex between
adults and children under age fifteen.
The second category, undue pressure, starts with the core
concept of rape law-that consent is negated by physical coer-
cion or threats of coercion. Undue pressure would expand upon
this concept, however, and consider other forms of coercion. At
this point, conceptions of status reenter the policy calculus-not
to render consent irrelevant, but instead to consider whether
apparent consent ("yes") has been rendered meaningfully. In
56. See Larry C. Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale
About the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. GRIM. L. 37,
95-124 (1993).
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situations in which one party stands in a position of authority or
power over the other party,5 the latter's acquiescence in sexual
relations might be doubted and more easily negated.
The third category, fraud, derives from the insight that sexual'
relations are often induced by representations. While it is surely
unrealistic to penalize most sexual misrepresentations, the law
ought to do so when they involve harm to the deceived party.
The most obvious example is that if one party has a communica-
ble venereal disease, especially HIV infection, the law ought to
impose upon that party an obligation to volunteer that informa-
tion to the other party. Thus, if Liz were infected with the HIV
virus, my view is that she had a legal duty to disclose that fact
to Jessie.
The regime I have outlined is unthinkable in today's politics,
but the strides made by feminism were unthinkable thirty years
ago. The keys to achieving such a regime are storytelling and
political visibility. Gay people must tell their own stories of
sexual intimacy, even if they tend to be greatly more conven-
tional than Pat Califia's. Equally important, gay people need to
be visible in the political process and to form alliances with
other groups, especially women's groups, whose regulatory agen-
da we generally share.
57. I am thinking specifically about employer-employee, minister/rabbi/priest-reli-
gious observant, guardian-ward, psychiatrist/doctor-patient, or teacher-student rela-
tionships.
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